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The Brain  Drain: 
An  Age-Old Problem 
by STEVAN  DEDIJER 
DISSENT  AND  MIGRATION  by  the  university  community  have 
been going on throughout history, especially in Europe, though 
they may seem recent phenomona to us.  Migration by men of 
science is actually as old as science itself; and, for at least 2,200 
years,  concerned politicians have tried either to encourage or 
prevent it. 
Since the beginning of recorded time,  the quest for knowl-
edge  has  been  associated  in  the  human  mind  with  distant 
travels.  In ancient  Greece,  from  the  little  known  about  the 
sixty most famous Greek scholars,  it seems three out of four 
of  them  emigrated  as  students,  professors,  scholars,  or  re-
searchers,  despite  the fears  and  difficulties  that leaving  one's 
native city then entailed. Until 300 B.C. or thereabouts, migra-
tion tended  to  flow  to  Athens.  Then Alexandria became the 
center of attraction for men of science as a result of the policy 
deliberately put into practice about 300 B.C.  by the first  king 
of the  Ptolemaic dynasty. It was  there that most of the  best 
scientific  and philosophical  work still  studied today was  done 
between 300 B.C. and 500 A.D. 
The Twelfth Century's 80 European Universities 
Even in Europe's darkest era, between the reigns of Justinian 
and Charlemagne, one can find  evidence of migration by  the 
learned and attempts to  influence it.  More signs  appear from 
the beginning of the Benedictine era (the eighth to the eleventh 
centuries)  when  European  education  and  erudition  (trans-
mitted  from  the  Arab  countries  via  Spain  and  Italy)  was 
concentrated  in  monastaries  or episcopal  schools,  staffed  by  3 4 
monks,  and  financed  and  run  by  bishops,  popes,  kings,  and 
emperors.  However,  the  first  direct  evidence  in  the  form  of 
original  documents  on official  policies  for  promoting  or pre-
venting  migration  by  researchers  appeared  only  after  the 
advent of European universities. 
The  first  European  universities-Salerno  and  Bologna  in 
Italy,  Montpellier and  Paris in  France-were founded  in the 
eleventh  and  early  twelfth  centuries.  By  1250,  there  were 
already nine universities in Italy, five  in France, two  in  Eng-
land, and four in Spain.  By  the end of the fifteenth  century, 
there  were  more  than  80  important universities  in  Europe: 
from Catania in Sicily and Salamanca in Spain to Aberdeen in 
Scotland and Uppsala in Sweden, from Oxford and Cambridge 
in  Great Britain to Cracow in Poland and Buda in Hungary. 
At the most famous universities, enrollment reached a peak of 
six or seven thousand at Paris and Bologna, three thousand at 
Oxford,  fifteen  hundred  at  Prague,  and  nine  hundred  at 
Vienna.  Their  teaching  bodies  were  large:  Bologna,  at  the 
beginning of the thirteenth century, paid 23  professors  at the 
Faculty of Law a  total of 60,000 livres.  Between  the twelfth 
and sixteenth  centuries,  European universities  laid the  foun-
dation for the revolution in scientific methods that occured in 
the year 1600. 
Abelard, the Dissenter 
Right from the beginning,  these  universities  were  cosmopoli-
tan.  Pierre  Abelard,  glory  of  the  University  in  Paris,  was 
born "abroad" in 1079 in Brittany. He was one of the many 
roving  scholars  celebrated  by  medieval  poets.  In  his  auto-
biography, he wrote:  "Logician, I  travelled  throughout prov-
inces where I had heard the practice of this art flourished, only 
to become a Peripatetic of sorts."* 
His  constant  questioning  of  accepted  ideas  made  him 
famous,  and  from  all  over  Europe  students  gathered  round 
him.  The  prior  of  Deuil  paid  homage  to  Abelard  in  these 
words:  "Rome sends you its students so  that you can instruct 
them ...  , hordes of young Englishmen feel no fear at the idea 
of crossing the  sea  .  . . distant Brittany sends you its  young 
brutes to educate. The Angevins conquer their innate ferocity 
when  with  you ....  Scots,  Gascons,  Spaniards,  Normans, 
Flemings,  Germans,  and  Swedes  study  with  you  and praise 
your intellect." 
Such  was  the  international  character  of European  higher 
education,  learning,  and  science.  At  that  time,  the  political 
fragmentation of Europe, where modern nation-states had not 
made  an  appearance,  presented  intellectuals  with  both  in-
centives and obstacles to migration. The concepts of state and 
citizenship  then  prevalent  throughout  Europe,  especially  in 
Italy, had more in common with the ancient Greek ideas than 
the  ones  we  know  today.  Citizenship  was  priceless  in  both 
ancient Athens and medieval  European towns  and  countries. 
Anyone born outside the city walls or the changing boundaries 
of a  province  ruled  by  a  prince  or a  king  was  considered  a 
stateless foreigner. 
*  Logicien, j' ai  parcouru toutes les provinces oil j' avais entendu dire 
qu'on exerr;ait  cet  art  avec  brio  et  finis  par  devenir  une  sorte  de 
peripateticien. 
How to Steal a University 
Nevertheless, history had rarely known so intense or so long a 
migration of intellectuals across  political  frontiers  as  the  one 
that occured in  European universities  between  the  thirteenth 
and  fifteenth  centuries.  Every  university  included  foreign 
students  who,  sooner  or  later,  organized  themselves  into 
"nations." 
In  certain  universities,  Paris  and  Bologna  for  instance, 
foreigners seem  to have made up the majority of the student 
population.  At Bologna  in  1265,  the  foreign  students  were 
organized  into  14  nations:  French  (from  lie-de-France), 
Spanish,  Provenc;ales,  English,  Picard,  Burgundian,  Poitevin, 
Touraine,  Norman,  Catalonian,  Hungarian,  Polish,  German, 
and Gascon. The Italians also had nations. 
Despite Europe's political fragmentation, its intellectual and 
cultural unity, based on Latin and the Catholic Church, facili-
tated migration. The direct causes of this migration were eco-
nomic, political,  social,  and intellectual  advantages gained by 
acquiring  knowledge  of law,  medicine,  theology,  philosophy, 
and, consequently,  natural sciences,  mathematics,  and letters. 
These factors, to which must be added the expansion of uni-
versity institutions and the conflicts  it never failed to provoke 
between local authorities and foreign  intellectuals,  resulted in 
special forms of migration by scholars and intervention by the 
public powers. One remarkable incident occurred in the center 
of Italy:  the outright theft of an entire university,  professors 
and students, by  a neighboring state.  It happened to Bologna. 
Bologna's Brain  Hunt 
The  University  of Bologna's  beginnings  are  connected  with 
the name of Irnerius,  professor of law,  who  taught theory of 
legal  systems  there around the end of the  eleventh  and early 
twelfth centuries. 
A  bit later, Bologna ran into its first  brain-drain problems. 
Long  before  the  end  of the  twelfth  century,  professors  dis-
played  a  noticeable  penchant .for  going  abroad  either  after 
disputes with the town authorities or offers  of higher salaries 
elsewhere. Thus, around 1150, Placentius left Bologna, to the 
great displeasure  of the Municipality,  to  found  a  Faculty of 
Law in Mantua. From then on, to prevent such defections, the 
authorities required each professor take an oath to remain at 
his  post.  It  did  not,  however,  prevent  one  Pillius,  who  had 
taken the oath in 1182, from giving in to enticing and repeated 
offers from Modena. 
At the end of the twelfth century and the beginning of the 
thirteenth,  Bologna  felt  its  existence  threatened  by  the  fact 
that not only its  professors but also  whole groups of students 
were  negotiating  with  other  cities  for  the  transfer  of  their 
"studium." In this respect, what happened in Bologna in 1188 
was to occur again several more times in the course of the two 
following  centuries,  in Bologna as  well as  in  other European 
cities  and  states.  That  year,  the  city  of  Reggio  founded  a 
Faculty of Law after signing a  contract with one Jacobus de 
Manda who had promised to lead Bologna's scholars. In 1204, 
Vicenza  founded  its  university  by  appealing  to  a  group  of 
professors and students at Bologna who were dissatisfied  with 
the few rights the authorities had given them. Death Penalty for Emigrants 
To prevent further losses,  Bologna then promulgated the first 
long  series  of  laws  and  ordinances  intended  to  forbid  the 
"flight from  the university." This is  an excerpt from an edict 
published  in  1274:  "By  this  edict,  we  solemnly  forbid  any 
ecclesiastical or lay  person,  Bolognese  or foreign,  either per-
sonally or by messenger,  letter or other means,  to attempt to 
negotiate  with  ecclesiastical  or lay persons,  colleges,  univer-
sities,  regions,  communes, or communal entities,  the transfer 
of the  studium of the city  of Bologna  to  another  place.  No 
citizen  or inhabitant of the  city  of Bologna  may  attempt to 
take  students  away  from  the  city with  the  intention  of con-
tinuing the studium elsewhere." 
Later,  the  Bolognese  authorities  strengthened  their  laws 
against the thieves of universities.  In 1432, the death penalty 
appeared  again  in  the city statutes against  anyone,  citizen or 
foreigner,  who conspired to  transfer a studium from  the  city 
and against any Bolognese scholar more than 50 years old who 
should  leave  Bologna  to  give  courses  elsewhere  without  the 
permission of the city magistrates. 
None of these laws proved effective against migrations from 
Bologna,  since  the  Universities  of  Arezzo  (1215),  Padua 
(1222), Vercelli  (1228),  Sienna  (1246),  Pisa  (1343),  and 
Florence  ( 1349)  were founded after migrations or secessions 
from the University of Bologna.  These,  of course,  were  only 
the  major migrations.  There  were  fifteen  other  instances  of 
emigration from  the University of Bologna to  other cities. 
Sorbonne Closed for Six Years 
Numerous European universities were founded by mass migra-
tions  of  students  and  professors  from  certain  universities. 
Oxford was  founded  after a migration from  Paris during the 
third quarter of the twelfth century. Cambridge, in  1209, was 
the result of a migration from Oxford following the assassina-
tion of a woman by a scholar. In an attempt to settle the score, 
the  mayor  and  members  of the  bourgeoisie  descended  upon 
the delinquent's home,  and several persons were  arrested and 
executed.  Masters and students  dispersed to the  four  corners 
of Europe, but especially  to  Reading,  Paris,  and the  swampy 
little town of Cambridge. The universities of Angers in .France, 
and Leipzig  and Greifswald  in  Germany, were  also  born of 
secessions  by  professors and students from other universities. 
The University of Paris was the scene of a series of conflicts 
between  the  bourgeoisie  and  students  of  which  the  most 
famous  was  the  "great dispersal"  in  1228.  At carnival  time, 
some  students  who  had  been  relaxing  in  a  cafe  on  the  out-
skirts entered a tavern and "found a good and mellow wine." 
A dispute arose; several  students were  killed.  The University 
complained to the bishop and the legates,  but in vain.  Easter 
Monday,  the professors  decided  that if  justice were  not ren-
dered  within  the  month,  they  would  disband  the  University 
for six years. They kept their word; the Sorbonne was closed, 
and most professors and scholars left Paris. 
A Privilege: Questioning in the Rector's Presence 
From  the  Middle  Ages  on,  princes  acted  unscrupulously  in 
university affairs with the thought that one person's brain drain 
was another's brain gain. 
By  1321, Bologna's students and professors had left the city 
to settle in Imola. All the surrounding towns immediately saw 
a  unique chance to  establish  their own  universities.  Florence 
dispatched emissaries  to  offer  disgruntled  professors  and dis-
ciples high salaries, privileges, and the guaranties of complete 
academic freedom. Unfortunately, the envoys arrived too late: 
the best professors had already signed  a contract with Sienna 
and most of the students had followed  them.  Padua had also 
taken advantage of the situation before Florence, signing con-
tracts with a number of professors and scholars stipulating that 
in  addition  to  the  ordinary  university  privileges  the  rectors 
would, significantly, receive authorization to bear arms, which 
had been forbidden them in Bologna, and that scholars would 
be subjected to questioning only with rectors present. 
England Offers Hospitality To French Dissidents 
In 1229, we find in England under Henry III another example 
of the political utilization of conflicts arising in other commu-
nities. Upon learning of the "great dispersal" at the University 
of Paris, the king wrote the following  open letter:  "The King 
salutes you, professors and scholars of the University of Paris. 
We commiserate with  the  great tribulations  and  anxieties  in-
flicted on you by the wicked lords of the Parisians and desire 
to  remedy your situation,  in  full  veneration  of God and the 
Holy Church,  and  restore  your liberty.  We  should like  your 
University to know that if you want to move to Our Kingdom 
of England to  devote yourselves to study, We will assign you 
any commune or village you choose and protect your freedom 
and  tranquility  in all  ways  that please  God and you." Cam-
bridge benefited the most from this publicity. 
The creation of nation-states governed by kings, who during 
the fourteenth  and fifteenth  centuries reinforced their power, 
little  by  little  diminished  the  international  migration  of stu-
dents and scholars in Europe. 
Thus, in 1409, in  Prague, the reinforcement of the national 
character of universities was witnessed:  a delegation from the 
"bohemian  nation"  asked  for  three  votes  in  the  University 
against one vote for each of the other three nations. The king 
promulgated an  edict to  this  effect on January 18.  The most 
powerful nation in  the University, the  German nation,  swore 
to leave Prague as  a university body, doctors and disciples,  if 
the  decree  were  not !.-evoked.  It was  not,  and overnight  the 
entire  German  nation  left.  Some  went  to  Heidelberg  and 
Cologne;  most  went  to  Leipzig  to  establish  Germany's  first 
real university, with a national enrollment of 500 students. 
••• 
Professor Dedijer teaches at the  University of Lund, Sweden. 
This  article  is  adapted  from  a  paper  he  presented  at  the 
Lausanne conference on the Brain Drain. This paper and other 
essays on the same topic have been published by the Centre de 
recherches europeennes de Lausanne as L'Exode des cerveaux 
and by Macmillan in the United States as The Brain Drain.  5 6 
Should Europe Recall Its Scientists? 
SOME  NEW  THOUGHTS  ON  THE  "BRAIN  DRAIN" 
by ALESSANDRO  SILJ 
ABOUT  65,000  EUROPEAN  SCIENTISTS  and  engineers  have  left 
Europe since World War II to reside  abroad,  many  more if 
physicians and surgeons are included. More than half of them 
have come to the United States. That is  why Europeans have 
begun to  worry.  However,  in the heat of the  debate  on the 
so-called "technology gap," the "brain drain" has often been 
the  subject  of  exaggerated  statements.  Fortunately,  some 
recent studies examine the importance and implications more 
objectively.1 
Objectivity  does  not necessarily  mean statistical  accuracy. 
The National Science Foundation (NSF) is the only institution 
so far to make a  serious  effort at analyzing  and interpreting 
the statistics published by  the U.S.  Immigration and Natural-
ization Service. Even a country which claims to be badly hurt 
by the brain drain, the United Kingdom, has virtually no sta-
tistics to offer except those furnished by the American immi-
gration service. 
Existing  statistics  have  limitations:  an engineer  in France 
may  be  one  thing  and  in  the  United  Kingdom  something 
entirely  different.  American  statistics  mention  several  sub-
categories  of engineers,  including  "sales  engineers,"  a  rarity 
in Europe.  Moreover,  an  aeronautical  engineer,  a  civil  engi-
neer, or an electrical engineer, may be such only by their own 
definition; in other words,  because they  said so  in their visa 
applications.  Comparisons between  one  country and  another 
can be misleading,  just as  the term "drain" itself is  mislead-
ing;  it would be more proper to talk of migrations of human 
capital. 
This article deals with the international migrations of scien-
tists and engineers.  These cover several  routes,  among which 
the most popular are those linking Europe, Canada, and Asia 
to  the  United  States.  However,  the  exact  size  of each  flow 
cannot be determined, for  although we  know the number of 
persons  who  enter the  United  States,  we  do  not know  how 
many  of  them  eventually  return  to  their  native  countries. 
Besides, each flow should be evaluated not only quantitatively 
but also  qualitatively. Sometimes one individual means more, 
for both the country he leaves  and the country  to  which  he 
migrates, than a whole team of experts.  Enrico Fermi is  just 
one  example.  The  figures  in  this  article  cover  both  actual 
arrivals in the United States  and changes of visa  status,  that 
is,  they  include  scientists  and  engineers  who  were  already 
living  in  the  United  States  and  who  changed  their  original 
visas to immigrant visas. 
American statistics on the brain drain began in  1949. That 
year,  only  1,369  engineers  and  scientists  immigrated  to  the 
United States. By  1967, the number had reached 12,523. Until 
1966, slightly more than 50 per cent of the immigrants came 
1 In  addition  to  the  reports  by  the  National  Science  Foundation 
and  "The  Brain  Drain",  a report presented  to  the  British  Parlia-
ment  by  the Secretary of State for  Education and  Science and  the 
Minister  of Technology  (London,  October  1967  in  the  article  re-
ferred to as the Jones Report). I am indebted mainly to the articles 
submitted at the international conference on the "brain dtain" held 
at  Lausanne,  Switzerland,  in  August  1967  (particularly  those  by 
Brinley  Thomas  and  George  Coutsoumaris);  Harry  Johnson's 
"The Economies  of the  'Brain Drain':  The Canadian Care"  (Mi-
nerva, Spring  1965); and Brinley Thomas's "The International Cir-
culation of Human Capital" (Minerva, Summer 1967). 
from  Europe.  In  1967,  Asians  displaced  Europeans  as  the 
largest regional group. The sharp increases which occurred in 
1957, 1963, and again in 1966 and 1967, are mainly the result 
of  changes  in  the  U.S.  immigration  laws;  the  latest  have 
brought about a relative decline of European immigrants and 
a  sharp  increase  of immigrants  from  Asia.  Incidentally,  the 
sharp increase in 1957 was not due, as some have said, to the 
effect of the first  Sputnik on American research and develop-
ment expenditures.  Sputnik  was  launched  in  October,  while 
the 1957 figures  cover the fiscal year ended on June 30,  1957. 
Even American efficiency  cannot be expected to be that far-
sighted. 
How Europe Compares With The Rest Of The World 
A few years ago many Canadians complained that the United 
States  was  draining  their best brains  and  that many  British 
emigrated  to  Canada only  to  move  on  to  the United States 
soon  afterwards.  Recent  studies  have  shown  that  Canada, 
like the United States, is  not a loser in this international game. 
Louis Parai estimated that the  immigration of human capital 
to  Canada in  the  1953-63  period  represented  a  total  value 
of  about  $37  million  (counting  the  costs  of educating each 
emigrant in  his native country), while the emigrations to the 
United States  were  roughly  equivalent  to  $20  million.  The 
relative  instability  of  Canada's  immigration-in  its  role  as 
way-station for  the United States-may be the real  problem. 
It takes a while for an immigrant to adjust to his new environ-
ment; and if he reaches his optimum productivity at about the 
time he is  ready to take off again, then Canada actually gains 
less  from  this  type  of  immigration  than  the  figures  would 
suggest. 
For lack of information, the case of developing countries is 
not easy to define. Emigration of scientists and engineers from 
developing  countries  do  not  usually  represent  a  higher  per-
centage of national human resources than they do in Europe, 
but the total stock of professional manpower is  much smaller. 
The loss of one individual can mean the end or serious delay 
of an entire program. Europe, with its universities and profes-
sional schools, can more easily replace its losses. 
Developing  countries  are  more  likely  to  lose  out  on  this 
kind of emigration, but judgment must be made case by case. 
In 1963, 16 Nigerian physicians were practicing in the United 
States.  The figure  is  relevant  when  we  consider that Nigeria 
has one doctor for every 50,000 inhabitants and that in  1963 
its only medical school graduated 19 new M.D.'s. On the other 
hand, the Philippines is the largest exporter of medical person-
nel to the United States; but about 70 per cent of its graduates 
in scientific and technical disciplines belong to the medical pro-
fession.  Only  14,000 of the 28,000 M.D.'s practice medicine, 
and being a doctor in the Philippines represents more a social 
than a professional value. Therefore, it can hardly be said that 
immigration  of M.D.'s and nurses  to  the  United States  is  a 
loss for the Philippines. 
Other studies dealing with Greece and Latin America show 
that some countries have benefitted from this kind of migra-
tion. Indeed, they point to the surprising conclusion that Latin 
America's balance of migration shows a surplus:  more Euro-
peans have come to Latin America in the past 20 years than 
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Immigration of Scientists and Engineers to the United States, 
1957-1967.  While  total  immigration  has  increased  dramatic-
ally, that from the Six remains remarkably stable. 
SOURCE: "Il mercato dei cervelli," page 6. 
New U. S. Immigration Law Will Slow European Drain 
Between  June  30,  1956,  and  July  1,  1967,  about  31,000 
European  scientists  and  engineers  emigrated  to  the  United 
States.  In  my  evaluation  of  the  emigration  to  the  United 
States between 1949-1956, as well as European emigrations to 
other countries  (Australia,  Canada and Latin America)  and 
thanks  to  some  statistical  acrobatics,  I  have  concluded  that 
about 65,000 scientists  and engineers have  left Europe since 
the end of World War II. 
The  variations  of  emigration  from  Europe  correspond 
roughly with the variations of total immigration of scientists 
and engineers into the United States.  However, there are im-
portant differences within Europe, and as  Chart I  shows,  the 
European Community as  a whole has been remarkably stable. 
In  1967,  the  Community  "exported"  to  the  United  States 
fewer scientists and engineers than it did in 1957. While immi-
gration from  all  of Europe rose  127  per cent between  1958 
and  1967,  immigration from  the  Community increased  only 
by  a  modest  23  per cent.  The  United Kingdom  has  shown 
much more sensitivity in adapting its  outflow to variations in 
U.S.  demand.  Within  the  European  Community,  Germany 
shows  the greatest flexibility  and is,  in fact,  after the United 
Kingdom, the main exporter of scientists and engineers to the 
United States.  In percentage terms,  however,  Dutch emigra-
tion is  almost twice as high as Germany's. 
About 2,400 European scientists and engineers left Europe 
in 1965; the figure rose to about 4,500 in 1967. This increase, 
mainly due to immigrants from the United Kingdom  (which 
were 790 in 1958  and rose to  2,293  in  19{)7), was  the result 
of the  transition  between  the  old  and  the  new  immigration 
laws.  It would  take  too  long to explain  here  how  this  hap-
pened in practice, but there can be little  doubt that,  for in-
stance, anticipation of the new law did inflate visa applications 
from Western European scientists  and engineers.  In the long 
run, the new American Immigration Law of 1965,  as  I  have 
already pointed out,  should bring about a  relative decline of 
European immigrants and a sharp increase of immigrants from 
Asia.  Only  about  530  Asian  scientists  and  engineers  immi-
grated to the United States in 1965, but as  many as  4,740 in 
1967!  The 1965  Act abolished  the traditional  national quota 
system  and  established  a  preferential  system  within  which 
170,000 visas are reserved every year for the countries outside 
of the Western Hemisphere, and of these, only  17,000 can be 
filled  by  "members of the professions or those having special 
talents  or education." The visas  are granted on a  first-come, 
first-serve basis. If one considers that the quota includes coun-
tries  like  Formosa,  India,  the  Philippines,  Korea-that  is, 
countries which are major exporters of "brains" to the United 
States-it becomes  obvious  that  the  new  law  will  severely 
limit immigrations from Europe. The country most likely to be 
affected  is  Great  Britain.  My  guess,  based  on  the  present 
situation and present trends, is  that immigration from Europe 
will level off in the next two or three years to an annual rate of 
approximately 3,000 visas. 
Does Europe Gain from the "Drain"? 
The figures  so  far express  the  "negative"  aspect of the  phe-
nomenon-the  "loss"  of  scientists  and  engineers  to  their 
native  countries.  However,  such  migration  also  brings  ad-
vantages. 
No statistics  are available  on the number of scientists  and 
engineers who eventually return to Europe. However, a study 
of the Swedish  situation made by the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development concluded that Sweden's 
actual  losses  in 1957-61  totaled  25  scientists  and  engineers, 
and not  106  as  shown in the U.S.  statistics.  Interviews have 
convinced  me  that  the  "returns"  are  more  numerous  than 
one generally might suspect. Therefore, a double re-evaluation 
is  needed. The returns reduce the total number of emigrations 
and represent a  gain  to the  country of birth when  a  person 
comes  back  with  a  professional  specialty  and  experience 
abroad.  The relatively young  age  of the  emigrants  seems  to 
bear this  out.  According to the  NSF,  44  per cent  of  all  the 
scientists and engineers who immigrated to  the United States 
in  1967  were  under  30  years  of age,  and  only  7  per cent 
were over 44 years old.  7 8 
In  addition  to  the  "emigrants,"  many  foreign  scholars, 
teachers  and  students  go  every  year  to  the  United States  to 
work and to study in American universities.  In the academic 
year 1964-65, more than 7,000 foreign scholars did research or 
taught  in  American  universities,  39  per  cent  of  them  were 
Europeans;  and  about  35,000  foreign  students,  13  per  cent 
from Europe, were doing graduate work under exchange pro-
grams  (visa type "J"); many others came on their own  (visa 
type "F"). Fewer than 1 per cent of the scholars and students 
who come to the United States under exchange programs ask 
to remain. 
Internal Migrations Among European Countries 
If Europe is considered as  a whole, internal migrations should 
not  be  counted either as  a  plus  or minus.  Taking countries 
singly,  the  situation  is  different.  In  some  cases,  the  losses 
caused  by  emigration  to  the United States  are  compensated 
by  immigration  from  other  European  countries.  Sweden  at-
tracts  scientists  and  engineers  from  Norway  and  Denmark. 
Twenty per cent of the  Danish engineers  work abroad,  one-
third  of them  in Sweden.  Many  Norwegian  engineers  work 
in Germany; and Germany, also, attracts specialists from East-
ern Germany, Austria, and Switzerland.  Many German scien-
tists who leave their country choose to go  to other European 
countries, especially to France. The research staff of the Centre 
Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique includes 575 foreigners, 
most  of them  Europeans.  Figures pubished  by  the  NSF  con-
firm  this  intra-European mobility.  A  comparison  of statistics 
on immigration by country of birth with those by country of 
last residence, shows for instance, that in  1967, out of a total 
of  164 scientists  and  engineers who left France to  go  to  the 
United States,  46 per cent were  not  French citizens.  Of  all 
the Germans who entered the United States in  1967,  22 per 
cent  came  from  the  United  Kingdom  and  other  European 
countries,  and  11  per  cent from  Canada while  21  per  cent 
of  the  scientists  and  engineers  who  left  Germany  for  the 
United States in  1967  were  not Germans. This percentage is 
even  higher  for  Holland-29  per  cent,  and  for  Italy.  The 
figures  clearly  indicate  that  several  European  countries  are 
in the black in their balance of migrations. 
Finally, in calculating the net drain, the scientists and engi-
neers who come to  Europe from  Asia and Africa should  be 
considered.  The flow  is  especially  important  for  the  United 
Kingdom which, in  1961-66, recovered  12,500 of the  17,000 
engineers it had "lost." Despite the lack of figures  for France, 
it  is  well  known  that many young Africans come  to  France 
to  study  and  work.  Probably  the  Netherlands,  too,  is  in  a 
similar position with respect to  some Asian countries. 
The facts and figures show the complexity of the phenome-
non and the inconsistency of some claims that Europe is being 
"drained," when there  is  actually  a  multifold  migration  pat-
tern.  For instance,  many  Americans  go  to  Europe  to  study 
and work,  and American researchers  are contributing to  im-
portant research projects in Europe. The Centre Europeen de 
Recherches  N ucleaires  (CERN),  in  Geneva,  owes  much  to 
American  scientific  leadership.  And  what  about  the  money 
American foundations have poured into European universities 
and research institutes? This is  a phenomenon in  which petty 




400  ~ 
\  J  300  r\. 
"' 
200  \ 
\ I "' 
100  \1•  --
~  ~  '  /17  -' 
........... ~ 
~  -··· 
0 




~  / 





R.)  (F. 
v 
nds 
taly  Nek31 
~  ; 
-
,  r-ra nee 
ium  Bel~ 
/ 
1957  '58  '59  '80  '61  '62  '63  '64  '65  '66  '67 
Emigration  of Scientists and  Engineers from  the  Community 
to the United States, 1957-1967. 
SOURCE:  "II mercato dei cervelli," page 86. 
run,  what would  become of a  country that shut its  frontiers 
to the migration of scientists, cutting itself off from the knowl-
edge and the creativity that accompany international exchange? 
What is Wrong With Britain? 
More than 40 per cent of European engineers  who  emigrate 
to the United States are British; over 80 per cent in the aero-
nautical  industry.  This  is  the  only  sector  so  far  (apart per-
haps from electronics)  for which the emigration has become 
a  source  of  serious  problems.  However,  emigration  is  the 
result,  not  the  cause,  of the  difficulties  of the  British  aero-
nautical  industry. If European  industry's  successes  or short-
comings  were  measured  by  volume  of migration,  we  would 
have  to  conclude  that the  European chemical  industry  is  in 
bad  shape,  as  over  50 per cent  of European  scientists  who 
emigrated to the United States between  1962 and  1966 were 
chemists; yet of all  European industries,  chemicals  is  one  of 
the most competitive. Explaining  why  so  many  engineers  leave  for  the  United 
States,  the  Society  of British  Aerospace  Industry  wrote  "an 
important factor  is  the  loss  of faith  in  the  stability  of  long 
and short-term planning for the industry, and the lack of any 
clear and  convincing  policy  on  the part of the  Government 
in support of a working program which could be equated with 
a  worthwhile  career  in  our  aerospace  industry."  The  diffi-
culties of British industry are probably due,  among other rea-
sons, to its over-ambitious attempt to undertake too many dif-
ferent  and  costly  projects-from  the  supersonic  jet  to  the 
aerobus to the vertical take-off-an approach which led  to  a 
number  of  cancellations,  in  some  cases,  when  the  project 
already reached the flying prototype stage. These failures must 
be  compared  with  the  successes  of the  Swedish  and  Dutch 
aeronautical industries, which have concentrated on a limited 
number of projects,  have  achieved  excellent  technical  stand-
ards, and do well in selling their products. In recent years, the 
British have changed their policy and have been leaning more 
towards joint international projects. 
I have not come across additional examples of other coun-
tries or,  as  far as  the United Kingdom is  concerned, of other 
sectors where migrations created serious difficulties. The alarm 
created by the "brain drain" in recent years has been triggered 
more by figures published in the United States than by a thor-
ough  analysis  of  the  causes  and  the  consequences  of  the 
phenomenon in Europe. 
Why Do They Leave? 
A  survey  of the causes  which  lead many  Europeans  to  seek 
a job abroad reveals some interesting facts. It should come as 
no  surprise  that  the  United  States  should  exert  a  powerful 
attraction  for  many  talented  young  men.  The  very  mobility 
of European scientists and engineers confirms their availability, 
and it is perfectly natural for many Europeans to wish to par-
ticipate  in  projects  which  have  no  counterpart  in  Europe. 
Europe  breeds  scientists  and  engineers  in  a  number  of dis-
ciplines but often offers  them  no  adequate way  of exploiting 
their qualifications. 
Does this mean that Europe produces more specialists than 
it  needs  and  that  this  is  why  Europe  exports  talents?  Some 
refute this hypothesis as  being simplistic and point to the fact 
that  Europe's  student  population  is  much  smaller  than  the 
United  States'.  In  the  United  States,  31  out of every  1,000 
inhabitants  are  college  or  university  students,  as  compared 
with  8  in the United  Kingdom,  10 in  France, and 5 in  Ger-
many.  However, U.S.  statistics  include  the first  two  years  of 
undergraduate studies, which correspond to the last two years 
of high school  (lycee)  in Europe.  Moreover, it seems  to me 
that the student population must be related to  the total needs 
of a country's economy. The American economy is  a complex 
machine.  Because  of  its  size,  diversification,  and  advanced 
technology, it needs many more specialists than the European 
economies.  If the  best  Italian  aerospace  engineers  work  in 
California, it is  because  they would  be  unemployed  in Italy. 
Are Salaries a Factor? 
Undoubtedly,  the  attraction  of higher American salaries  has 
some  importance  as  a  cause of these  migrations.  The  Jones 
Report gives  comparative data which, however imperfect, are 
interesting. They show that European countries (United King-
dom,  Holland,  and Sweden),  where  scientists  and  engineers 
are paid relatively low salaries, also have the greatest "drains." 
The data also show that European countries with lower stand-
ards  of living  do  not  necessarily  pay  the  lowest  salaries  for 
qualified  manpower.  France  and  Italy  pay  their  engineers 
much  higher  salaries  than  the  United  Kingdom,  and  both 
countries are at the bottom of the "brain drain" list. 
However,  salaries  are  only  partially  relevant.  What really 
drives  many  Europeans to  the United States  is  the challenge 
inherent in the availability of so  many resources which allows 
them  to  pursue  their  professional  interests.  Unlike  Europe, 
the  American  system  rewards  talented  young  people  well. 
Careers  advance  faster,  initiative  is  welcomed,  age  and 
seniority  are  not  prime  factors.  According  to  the  British 
Council of Engineering Inistitutions, "the lack of faith  on the 
part of its  young men  in  the  future of the  United Kingdom 
as  a  technological  power  is  a  serious  threat to the  country's 
future. The greatest incentive for a young man is  the prospect 
of an  interesting  job;  to  many,  this  is  more  important  than 
a high salary." 
Linguistic problems,  although not irrelevant, should not be 
exaggerated. Most scientists and engineers in Europe can read 
and  speak  English.  However,  familiarity  with  the  language 
certainly inflates  British and Dutch migrations.  Cultural fac-
tors may play a relevant role. If only few Italians and French 
scientists  emigrate  to  the  United States,  it  may  be  due  to a 
certain reluctance to shift from one way of life to another. The 
fact that Holland, probably the most "Atlantic" oriented of all 
European  countries,  also  has  the  highest  rate  of  migration 
to  the United States is probably not just coincidence. 
Is Europe "Financing" American R & D? 
Out of all  the causes  of migration,  one factor plays a  major 
role in determining, year after year, the size  of the  immigra-
tion  into  the  United  States-namely the  American  research 
programs.  This  factor  acts  as  a  catalyst  for  all  the  others. 
A recent study by the U.S. House of Representatives' Govern-
ment Operations Subcommittee for Research and Technology 
Programs says "the powerful effect of even slight modifications 
in  the massive  Federal R  &  D  programs  on the  demand  for 
American scientists  and  engineers  suggests  that  the  demand 
for  immigrant  scientists  and  engineers,  constituting  an  addi-
tional  supply,  could also  be  affected  by  R  &  D  policies."  In 
1962,  the  acute  shortage  of scientists  and  engineers  was  at-
tributed to  the  extent of Government-sponsored  programs  in 
missiles,  industrial  application  of  solid-state  electronics,  and 
the establishment of various defense systems.  In 1963-64, the 
situation  changed  because  of  project  cancellations  or  com-
pletions, such as  Skybolt, Titan II, and  Ranger.  The 1965-66 
resurgence of demand is  attributed to  the Apollo  and Saturn 
programs,  the Nimbus meteorological satellites,  as  well  as  to 
Vietnam  military  needs.  The  same  report  points  out  that 
foreign  scientists  and  engineers  are  proportionately  more 
heavily engaged  in  R  &  D  than their American counterparts. 
More than half of the foreign scientists are in Federal R & D, 
compared with 35 per cent for U.S. scientists; and 41  per cent 
of the  foreign  engineers,  compared with  27  per cent  of all  9 10 
U.S.  engineers,  are in  Federal R  &  D.  The report deals  only 
with  scientists  and  engineers  from  developing  countries,  but 
we can assume that the same consideration is  valid for all the 
immigrants.  As  for  quality,  foreign  scientists  and  engineers 
taking part in Federal  R  &  D  programs have,  as  a  group,  a 
significantly  larger proportion  of Ph.D.  and  Master's  degree 
holders than the counterpart American groups. 
Brinley Thomas believes that there is  a definite  correlation 
between R  &  D  expenditures and the  immigration of profes-
sional  manpower.  He  attributes  this  phenomenon  largely  to 
the  rather low elasticity of supply of American scientists and 
engineers,  and  to  "the sluggish  way  in  which  the  American 
market  works."  He  shares  the  opinion  that  "the  desire  to 
avoid  competitive  bidding  [in  the  United  States]  sometimes 
takes  the  form  of no-raiding  agreements  between  otherwise 
competing firms  in the same industry"  (such as  those alleged 
to  exist  in  the  electrical  equipment,  electronics,  and  aircraft 
industries)  and  that  no-raiding  agreements  at home  tend  to 
stimulate raiding activities abroad. 
However, the U.S. market's lack of elasticity simply reflects 
the  real  cause:  the  chronic  failure  of American  universities 
to  supply  scientists  and  engineers  in  sufficient  numbers.  In 
1949,  immigration  made up  for  1.3  per cent of the  output 
of American universities.  This percentage has since increased 
and today is  of about 11  per cent for engineers. Without for-
eign  scientists  and  engineers,  American  technology  and 
economy would not be what they are today. 
The American Market: a Decompression Valve 
To say that the U.S.  shortage of professional manpower is  a 
major cause of the phenomenon known as  the  "brain drain" 
does  not mean  that  all  other  factors  are  irrelevant.  It does 
mean that the U.S.  shortage offers  a way out for people who 
are  not  satisfied  with  the  situation  in  their  own  countries. 
The U.S.  market,  in other words,  works  as  a  sort of decom-
pression  valve  for  all  the  dissatisfactions,  frustrations,  and 
ambitions  of  the  scientists  and  engineers  of the  rest  of the 
world. 
So, it may be true that Europe is  "financing"  (by providing 
manpower)  not  only  American  R  &  D  but  also  American 
industrial and economic achievements. Yet, the U.S. gain does 
not necessarily correspond to a European loss, since, in many 
cases,  Europe would not know what to  do with the scientists 
and engineers who choose to go abroad. 
I  would  go  further and say that,  since  Europe cannot use 
these  people,  it is  to its  interest  to  send  them  to  the United 
States where they can acquire new specialties and experience, 
rather  than  "freeze"  them  at  home  where  their  talents  are 
often wasted whenever no jobs or money are available for the 
tasks corresponding to their qualifications. 
I  am talking,  of course,  about today's Europe made up of 
single  countries  pursuing  often  contradictory  policies  and 
unable  or unwilling  to  invest  in  science  and technology  the 
energy  and  the  money  expected  from  modern  industrial 
powers. A unified Europe would, hopefully, know better what 
to do with its talents. 
The  question,  therefore,  is:  would  these  men  come  back 
should  a  unified  Europe offer  them  the  means  and the chal-
lenge  which  they  sought  in  the  United  States?  The  results 
of the interviews conducted by the Jones Commission and my 
own findings during my stay in the United States, would seem 
to  indicate  that  the  great  majority  of  them  would  indeed 
go back. 
Mr.  Silj  is  the  author of "1/  mercato dei  cervelli," Etas Kompass 
S.p.A.,  Milano,  1968,  and "Europe's  political puzzle-A study of 
the  Fouchet  Negotiations,"  Harvard  University,  1967,  as  well  as 
numerous articles on European affairs.  This article  is  based on ex-
cerpts from "I/ mercato dei cervelli" The  Communit~'s 
Mediterranean Neighbors 
by  FERDINANDO  RICCARDI 
THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY'S  efforts  to  establish  closer  eco-
nomic ties with its Mediterranean neighbors inexorably collide 
with political issues: 
•  What  kind  of  economic  agreement  would  enable  Yugo-
slavia to remain Communist while helping to lay an economic 
basis for its continuing political independence from the Soviet 
Union. 
•  Is  this  the right moment to  link Spain with  the  Six  and  if 
so, how close should the link be? 
•  Should the Community expand or freeze its association with 
Greece, in view of the change of regime in the spring of 1967, 
•  How  can  the  Community  make  equitable  concessions  to 
Arab countries, if it offers Israel associate status? 
The Six still have no common political position towards the 
Mediterranean countries  and still  show  a  strong tendency  to 
wave  one  national  flag  here  and  another  there,  instead  of 
speaking  in  the  name  of a  united  Europe.  Even  at  the  eco-
nomic level,  some delegations and pressure groups would still 
rather defend  their own  interests  than work together to  help 
these  turbulent  ancient  civilizations  enter  the  mainstream  of 
European progress. 
The Mediterranean countries are not clear about these mat-
ters  either.  Some  of them distrust  and  resent one  or another 
of  the  Community  members,  while  others  wage  war  and 
threaten  their neighbors.  Here  a  democratic  regime  tumbles, 
there a state of emergency is declared. 
Greece: Progress Blocked 
For the moment, no further progress  is  possible  in  the Com-
munity's  association  with  Greece,  because  some  of  the  asso-
ciation's  governing  institutions  (such  as  the  Joint  Parlia-
mentary Committee) cannot function under the current Greek 
regime.  The  Community  has  stopped  financial  aid  and  has 
delayed starting on the harmonization of agricultural policies. 
However, the preferential trade arrangements are still  oper-
ating,  and the framework of the association has  not been dis-
turbed.  Everything  can  be  set  in  motion  again  as  soon  as 
political circumstances permit. Then progress towards Greece's 
full  membership in  the Community will  continue,  as  provided 
in the Athens Agreement. 
Turkey: A Model 
The  Community's  successful  assoctatton  with  Turkey  is  a 
model for  relations with the Mediterranean countries. 
During  the  1964-69  "preparatory  stage,"  the  Community 
made  available  $175  million  in  financial  aid  to  Turkey  for 
important industrial and infrastructural projects and increased 
its  imports  of Turkish  products.  This  May,  a  joint Turkish-
Community  parliamentary  commission  recommended  that 
Turkey  should pass  from  the preparatory  to  the  transitional 
stage of membership on  December  I,  1969.  Now details  are 
being negotiated for the "transitional stage" leading gradually 
to economic union. 
Turkey's  road  to  full  membership  will,  however,  be  long 
and  difficult.  The  industrialization  process  is  straining  the 
Mr. Riccardi is  on the staff of Agence Europe, a daily  report 
on Community events published in Brussels. 
Turkish economy. To avoid. severe balance-of-payments crises 
and the risk of a currency collapse, Turkey will  have to take 
stern  measures.  The  joint  Commission  last  May  urged  the 
Community to  grant Turkey substantial  facilities  in  the  agri-
cultural  and  social  fields  to  help  meet  the  special  demands 
that a  customs  union would  make  on the  Turkish  economy. 
The recommendations,  which go  before the European Parlia-
ment and the Turkish National Assembly, stipulated that Tur-
key  should  receive  further  special  treatment  as  a  developing 
country.  In  the  meantime,  during  negotiations,  the  Commu-
nity's  financial  aid  to  Turkey  is  continuing.  The  European 
Investment Bank is  now preparing to finance a bridge over the 
Bosporus, connecting Asia with Europe. 
Cyprus: Fruit and Vegetables 
Cyprus is  considering some form of association with the Com-
munity.  A  trade  pact  with  the  Six  would  help  the  island's 
exports of fruit and vegetables  which,  except for  copper ore 
and concentrate, are  its  biggest export earners.  As  a member 
of the Commonwealth and  sterling area, Cyprus now exports 
most of its production to Britain. 
Morocco and Tunisia: Partial Association 
Negotiations  with  the  two  countries  were  concluded  at  the 
end of February,  and  agreements  instituting  "partial  associa-
tions" were signed at the end of March and came into force on 
September  1,  1969.  In  the  first  stage  of association  the  ties 
between  the  Community  and  these  countries  will  be  purefy 
commercial:  duty-free  entry  to  the  Common  Market for  all 
Tunisian  and  Moroccan  industrial  products,  and  preferential 
entry for most agricultural produce. 
In the next three years, negotiations will  open to extend the 
association  by  providing for  technical  and  financial  aid,  free-
dom of establishment and  investment,  and free  moveme~t of 
labor. 
Algeria: Serious Worry 
Here is  one of the most serious worries for the  Community's 
institutions.  Some  member  governments  refuse  to  begin 
negotiations*  with  the  Algerian  Government  as  long  as  it 
considers itself at war with Israel. The Six are all  aware that 
sooner or later Algeria  will  be  linked  with  the  Community. 
Most of the  Six  have withdrawn  the  tariff concessions  given 
to Algeria in the early years of the Common Market, especially 
on wine-but they have not questioned France's right to allow 
Algerian  products  duty-free  entry.  The situation  is  therefore 
awkward  and  legally  uncertain:  each  Community  country 
gives  Algeria preferential  treatment, though there  is  no  valid 
legal basis for doing so,  and the arrangements differ from one 
country  to  the  next.  Such  a  situation  cannot  last  and  the 
Community must start to straighten it out. 
Lebanon: Another Model 
Lebanon concluded a limited trade agreement with  the Com-
munity,  supplemented  by  technical  assistance  arrangements. 
'''Ed.  note:  Algeria,  until  independence,  was  a  French  Overseas 
Territory  and  therefore  a  legal  part  of  the  Community.  Nego-
tiations would  establish a new  basis  in  law  for  Algeria's relations 
with the Community.  11 12 
A  Lebanese weaver. In the Mediterranean countries where  Turkish 
and Arabic influences  were  strongest,  weaving of fine  cloth,  rugs, 
and tapestries had developed into an art by the time of the Middle 
Ages in  Europe.  Courtesy  National  Council of Tourism  in  Leba-
non, New York 
This agreement has had only a slight practical impact; but the 
combination of trade and technical  assistance  could  serve  as 
a model for accords with other countries if the member states 
can resist  the  temptation of wrapping technical  assistance  up 
in national, rather than Community, colors. 
Israel: Industrial Goods 
The Community's relations with Israel currently pose a prob-
lem. They are now governed by a trade agreement concluded 
in 1964 for three years and since extended unilaterally by the 
Community. Israel considers  the agreement pointless. 
The Council's decision just this  spring to reduce the Com-
munity's customs  duty on Israeli citrus fruits by  40 per cent 
will  give  Israeli exporters only partial relief,  because Tunisia 
and Morocco receive an 80 per cent cut under their association 
agreements with the Community. 
Moreover,  the Six  have not yet found  any solution to the 
problem  of  Israel's  industrial  exports  to  the  Community. 
France has opposed any arrangement with Israel at this stage. 
The  Six  bought  26.4  per  cent  ($169.3  million)  of  Israel's 
annual  exports  ($640.2  million)  in  1968.  Israel  imported 
$316.5  million  worth  of goods  from  the  Six  last  year,  29.3 
per cent of its total imports ( $1.083 million). 
The  1964  agreement  gave  Israel  some  minor  customs  re-
ductions  on fewer  than two  dozen items.  Some  quotas  were 
also  imposed,  for example,  on sales  of bromine  products to 
Italy. However, at the time, the Israeli authorities thought the 
accord would  pave the way for eventual association with the 
Community. On that assumption, Israel has since 1964 largely 
abolished  administrative  import controls  and  95  per cent of 
its  imports  have  been liberalized,  but in most cases  adminis-
trative  controls  were  replaced  by  heavy  duties.  These  tariffs 
are slated for reduction in  stages in  anticipation of an associ-
ation  agreement  that  would  give  Israel  time  to  adjust  its 
economy and customs tariff structure. 
At  present,  association  seems  unlikely,  so  that  Tel  Aviv 
might  perhaps  consider  accepting  a  preferential  agreement 
with the Six. The Israeli Government has asked for close links, 
with complete freedom of movement for all  goods, and it has 
stated  its  willingness  to  organize  its  economy  to  fit  into  the 
Common Market. The difficulties involved remain more politi-
cal  than  economic:  one  member  government  (France)  has 
been  unwilling  to  go  beyond  an  ordinary  trade  agreement; 
the others claim that a  balance must be struck between con-
cessions made, or to be made, to Arab countries and  any ties 
established with Israel. 
Spain: An  Ingenious Arrangement 
As  in Greece,  the  nature of the  Spanish  regime  has created 
serious political obstacles to close links between Spain and the 
Community.  The  European  free  labor  unions  for  instance, 
strongly oppose negotiations with the Spanish Government. 
The Community institutions are overcoming these political 
difficulties  by an ingenious  "two-tier" agreement.  The associ-
ation of Spain with the Community is accepted as the uUimate 
aim, but the first  phase would cover only trade.  The change-
over to the second phase-extending to finance,  movement of 
labor,  freedom  of investment-would  not  be  automatic  but 
conditional,  requiring  the  unanimous  approval  of all  parties 
and  based  on both economic and political  considerations.  At 
the  moment,  the  contents  of  the  first  phase  are  being  dis-
cussed.  Spain  would  like  the  accord  to  be  as  extensive  as 
possible, including substantial tariff cuts. 
Last year a first stage of trade negotiations was successfully 
concluded.  At the end  of  1968  the  Commission  reported  on 
the  negotiations  to  the  Council  and  made  proposals  for  the 
next round of negotiations. Yugoslavia: Economic Basis 
All of the Six have reacted favorably  to  Yugoslavia's request 
for special relations with the Community.  (Yugoslavia, unlike 
other  East  European  countries,  recognizes  the  Community's 
de jure existence.) 
Some member states have stressed the need to guarantee a 
market in the Community for Yugoslav goods su that Belgrade 
can continue to make purchases in the West that are essential 
for its  economic development  and,  indirectly,  for  its  political 
independence. Still unresolved is a technical solution for allow-
ing Yugoslav beef and veal exports (a major source of foreign 
exchange)  into the  Common Market without upsetting Com-
munity prices and cutting into sales of Community produce. 
Malta: Three Stages 
The Commission in general  accepts  the  case  for  an  associa-
tion  agreement  between  Malta  and  the  Community  as  pro-
posed by the Maltese Government, but thinks it too  early to 
decide  on  full  membership,  the  island's  ultimate  objective. 
Malta would like the Community to  take over the role in  the 
Maltese economy that Britain is  vacating. 
Malta has proposed a first  "adaptation" stage of five  years 
during which it would gradually reduce its tariffs on industrial 
and agricultural imports  by  35  per cent and the Community 
would cut duties on Malta's industrial exports by 70 per cent. 
A  second  five-year  "transition"  stage  would  follow  auto-
matically  during  which  free  access  to  Community  markets 
for Maltese agricultural products would be organized. At the 
same time, Malta would progressively adopt the Community's 
common external tariff and begin to  free movements of capi-
tal  and labor and  allow  Community companies  the  right  of 
establishment.  In  the  third  stage,  Malta  would  attain  full 
membership. 
Apart from the Community's modest trade agreement with 
Iran and a trade and technical aid feeler by the Egyptian Gov-
ernment, reported in early May in Cairo's AI Gumhuria, these 
are  the main currents in  the Community's relations  with the 
countries to the south.  In Greece, Spain,  and  other Mediter-
ranean countries,  where  domestic  political  factors  stop  prog-
ress,  the  Community  can  do  little  but wait.  In the  case  of 
several  Middle  East countries,  on the  other hand,  the  Com-
munity members do not agree. 
There is,  however,  another difficulty:  many products  that 
the  Mediterranean countries want to  sell  on the Community 
markets  are  highly  competitive  with  Community  products. 
Often  the  Community's  poor  regions,  in  Italy  and  France, 
have  the  most  to lose.  Italy  has  to  consider the  interests  of 
its citrus growers. France has some hard thinking to do before 
allowing  Yugoslav  beef  and  veal  preferential  access  to  the 
Common Market. 
Eventually,  the  experts  in  Brussels  will  find  satisfactory 
solutions to these complicated technical issues. A more crucial 
aspect  is  that  the  politician  should  not  forget  the  broader 
objective:  to associate the Community with countries that all 
form part of the European heritage. 
Dyeing skeins  of wool  for  carpets  in  Rabat.  Morocco  is  one  of 
several Mediterranean countries now making special efforts to keep 
their traditional  craft industries  from  vanishing.  Courtesy  Moroc-
can Office of Tourism, New York. 
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Europe's Workers Get A Say 
by WALTER  KENDALL 
"THOSE  WHO  INVEST  THEIR  LIVES  in a business  have  a bigger 
right to a say than those who merely invest their cash." This 
statement by Jack  Jones,  general  secretary-elect  of  Britain's 
largest  Transport  and  General  Workers'  Union,  is  sympto-
matic  of a big and continuing shift in labor opinion that has 
been taking place  in Europe. 
Along the  lines  expressed  by Mr.  Jones,  Germany's  labor 
union confederation, the 6,400,000-strong Deutsche Gewerk-
schaftsbund  (DGB)  is  now  engaged  in an  extensive campaign 
from  its  DUsseldorf  headquarters  to  extend  the  German 
unions'  Mitbestimmung  law-co-determination,  or  labor's 
rights of participation in management decisions.  With the aid 
of the  Social  Democratic  Party  (  SPD),  the  union  succeeded 
in having the law passed in the immediate postwar years. Now, 
the oos's new proposals, which have been taken up by the SPD 
in the  form of a  draft law  now  before  the Bundestag,  have 
Jed to a major controversy in the Federal Republic. 
Mitbestimmung  is  an  implicit  "sharing  of  power"  philos-
ophy  which  owes  as  much  to  Christian  thinkers  as  to  the 
socialist ideas that are  normally -regarded as its  source.  Since 
a  Weimer Republic Jaw  of 1920, German firms  have had to 
establish directly elected workers' councils that "police" labor 
contracts  as  shop stewards  do  in the  United States. 
German limited-company law establishes a three-tier corpor-
ate structure: shareholders, a board of supervisors (Aufsichts-
rat)  elected  by  the  stockholders'  meeting,  and  a  board  of 
management  ( Vorstand)  appointed  by  the  board  of super-
visors.  The board of supervisers  makes  the  policy  to  be  ex-
ecuted by the management board, which may have  11,  15, or 
21  members, depending on the size of the company. The man-
agement board usually consists of three directors, specializing 
in  commercial, technical,  and labor affairs,  and having equal 
authority. 
Germany's  co-determination  law  for  its  iron  and  steel 
industries,  enacted  in  1951,  provides  for  an  11-man  super-
visory board.  Stockholders elect five  members,  one of whom 
must not be  a stockholder. Workers also elect five  members: 
two from their own ranks; a third is  appointed by the majority 
union in the firm,  a fourth by the national union confederation, 
normally the DGB.  The DGB  also appoints a fifth member, who 
like  the  fifth  one chosen by  the  stockholders,  must be  inde-
pendent of the nominating group. There are thus eight mem-
bers,  divided  between  stockholders  and  labor  interests,  and 
two  "independent" members, one nominated by each side. An 
additional  "independent" member is  nominated  to  the board 
by the mutual consent of the parties. 
The board of supervisors  appoints its  own  chairman,  who 
is  usually,  but not necessarily,  a  representative  of the stock-
holders.  The board  of supervisors  thus  constituted  appoints 
the  three-man  Vorstand.  As  the  labor  director  cannot  be 
appointed against the vote of the workers' representatives, he 
is normally a labor nominee. This 1951  law now covers some 
90 large coal, iron, and steel  companies employing altogether 
about a million workers. 
Subsequent  efforts  by the  German unions  and  the  Social 
Democrats to extend this legislation to the rest of the German 
Mr. Kendall is a fellow of Sussex University's Center for Con-
temporary European Studies. 
economy  have  so  far  proved  unsuccessful.  However,  as  a 
concession  to  labor  demands,  company  Jaw  was  revised  in 
1952 to give workers outside the coal, iron, and steel industries 
a  minority  (one-third representation)  on the board of super-
visors.  This law,  however,  made  no  provision  at all  for  the 
appointment  of  a  worker-nominated  labor  director  to  the 
management board. 
As  may be  imagined, Germany's employers  and unions  by· 
no  means agree about Mitbestimmung.  Employers claim that 
the  legislation  is  socially  meaningless,  ineffective,  and  even 
harmful  to  economic  efficiency;·  Unions,  on  the  other hand, 
value  the  1951  Mitbestimmung  law  highly  and  demand  the 
extension of its  parity and labor provisions  to  other sectors. 
Since last fall the DGB  has campaigned for the extension of 
the  coal,  iron,  and  steel  co-determination  law  to  cover  all 
firms  that met at least two of the following criteria:  employed 
more than 2,000 people, had more than $18.5 million capital, 
did an  annual turnover of more than  $37.5  million. If these 
proposals  were  adopted,  co-determination  would  apply  to 
most large German companies. 
France's Divided Unions 
In  France,  where  the  unions  are  weaker  and  more  divided 
than in Germany, recent attempts to  increase labor participa-
tion in  management have come from the Government rather 
than from unions. Certain provisions, however, are already in 
force. 
In the first flush of postwar radicalism, at a time when many 
of  the  French  business  elite  were  badly  discredited  by  a 
record  of  wart.ime  collaboration,  important  legislation  on 
workers' participation was  passed.  In 1945-46, provision was 
made  for  the  establishment  of  a  comite  d'entreprise  in  all 
companies employing more than 50 workers. 
These  committees  consist  of elected  representatives  of the 
workers  and nominees  of management. The Jaw  requires  the 
employer to bring to the committee business and social issues, 
including projected layoffs  and reorganization proposals.  The 
committee itself,  however,  has no autonomous powers  and is 
merely  advisory.  Absence of real power has limited workers' 
interest, while employer determination to maintain managerial 
prerogatives, combined with the weak union organization and 
workers'  fear  of  victimization,  ensures  that  the  committees 
have little practical importance outside the field of administer-
ing social welfare provisions. 
France has  no real  equivalent of shop  stewards;  but after 
the spontaneous, semi-insurrectional sitdown strikes and occu-
pation  of factories  in  1936, legislation was  hurriedly enacted 
to  provide  for  the  election  by  all  workers  (organized  and 
unorganized) of delegues du personnel. Their task is  to pursue 
day-to-day grievances with the management. Normally elected 
from competing labor union lists of candidates, these workers' 
delegates have legal safeguards against unwarranted dismissal, 
which in practice have proved more formal than real. Accord-
ing to one authority, in four companies out of five,  candidates 
were  hard  to  find  as  early  as  1950.  Therefore,  while  legis-
lation  on  workers'  participation  rights  exists  in  France,  its 
overall significance remains limited. 
The nco-corporative ideas of the de Gaulle regime have led 
to  innovations  of  another  kind.  Under  recent  legislation,  a Except  in  Germany,  where  the  unions  are  relatively  strong,  the 
impetus  to  increase  labor's  voice  in  management  has  tended  to 
come from government. 
specified  percentage  of a  firm's  profits  must be  placed  in  a 
special  fund  for  the  benefit  of  its  workers  and  some  years 
later  be  paid  out  as  a  cash  dividend.  Unions  have  viewed 
this step as  an endeavor to  buy off working-class hostility and 
domesticate  an  alienated  labor force.  The results  are not yet 
clear. 
Italy's Management Commissions 
Workers' participation in Italy has more in common with the 
French system than with Germany's. When the partisans came 
down  from  the  hills  in  midsummer  1945,  occupying  many 
cities  in  the  industrial  north before  the  arrival of the  Allied 
armies, they set up management committees  (commissione di 
gestione)  in  many  plants,  which  challenged  the  right  of 
management  to  do  as  it  pleased.  This  high  tide  of  revolu-
tionary endeavor receded fairly rapidly and without producing 
anything approaching a co-determination law  on the German 
model. 
As  a  legacy  of  the  occupation  of the  factories  in  1920, 
Italian law still obliges firms  to establish commissione interne 
(often  quite  wrongly  described  as  "grievance  committees," 
which  they  are  not).  They  are  best  likened  to the  German 
workers' councils, but without the strength of a unified labor 
union movement.  behind them. Elected by both organized and 
unorganized workers on the basis of competitive union slates, 
they have often been invested with an exaggerated importance 
quite  out  of line  with  their  actual  powers,  which  are  very 
limited. 
Although  the  commissione  interne  in  theory  possess  im-
portant consultative functions, they have rarely exercised them 
in  practice,  unless  backed  by a  strong trade union  organiza-
tion.  In the 1950's, management frequently manipulated these 
bodies,  using  them as  spurious bargaining agents so  that they 
could  refuse  recognition to  union organizations in  the  plant. 
This experience has led the unions to view the whole question 
of  participation  with  some  reserve.  There  is,  however,  an 
Italian  tradition  of  revolutionary  spontaneity  aiming  at 
workers'  control,  and  the  issue  could  again  come  to  the 
forefront. 
Benelux: National Borders 
Neither  Belgium  nor  the  Netherlands  has  experienced  up-
surges like those in France in 1936 or in  Germany and Italy 
in  the  postwar  and  interwar  years.  Although  divided  on 
religious  and  political  grounds,  the  unions  remain  fairly 
strong.  Bodies  similar  to  the  German  workers'  council,  the 
French  delegues  du  personnel,  and  the  Italian  commissione 
interne  exist  in  both  countries.  Because  unions  are  strong, 
these bodies exercise some important power in policing union 
contracts  and  other  labor  provisions. 
Decision  sharing  at  local  level  is,  however,  limited,  and 
cooperation at national level  is  more important. The postwar 
years  often saw  union,  management, and government partici-
pating jointly in making decisions about the national economy, 
and especially the rate of wage growth and method of alloca-
tion. In the Netherlands, the Labor Foundation, established in 
1945, has served as  an important center for joint consultation 
between  capital  and  labor  in  social  affairs.  In both  Belgium 
and the  Netherlands,  joint decision-making  has  tended  to  be 
at  the  national  level  rather  than  on  the  possibly  more  im-
portant plant level and below. 
Although there is  a degree of formal support for a measure 
of workers participation in management in  Luxembour~, the 
current situation there resembles  the one in France and Italy 
more  than  Germany's.  The  Socialist-Christian  Democrat 
coalition had drafted plans for a limited measure of obligatory 
co-determination in industry, but these proposals were shelved 
when the Socialist-Christian Democrat coalition was  replaced 
by a Christian-Liberal coalition earlier this year. 
In Europe,  the  issue  of  workers'  participation is  one  that 
must occupy  the  whole  Community in  coming years  if  only 
because it  is  involved in the  agreement on a  draft European 
company  law.  The  extremely  powerful  DGB  is  unwilling  to 
accept  any  proposal  that  does  not  include  co-determination 
on the lines  of Germany's existing Mitbestimmung legislation. 
The  absence  of such  provisions  would  leave  German  man-
agement free  to  avoid  all  its  co-determination obligations  by 
the  simple  procedure  of  closing  down  its  companies  under 
German law and re-registering them as European corporations 
under the  European company  statute.  The  DGB  plainly  fears 
a  European  version  of  the  U. S.  experience  which  led  one 
critic to remark that "Standard Oil  has  done everything with 
the  legislature  of New Jersey except refine  it."  Other union 
federations in Europe are likely to back the DGB  on this  point 
and use  their important political  influence  on its  behalf. 
Professor  Gerard  Lyon-Caen  of  the  University  of  Paris, 
assisted  by  professors  from five  other European countries,  is 
now  seeking  a  formula  for  workers'  participation  in  the 
administration of firms  registered under a European company 
law  that would  be  acceptable  to  the  governments  and  social 
organizations  of the  Six.  15 16 
COMMUNITY  NEWS 
COMMUNITY TAKES FRANC DEVALUATION  IN  STRIDE; 
GIVES FRANCE 2 YEARS TO READJUST TO COMMON  FARM  PRICES. 
The  French  Government's  decision  to  de-
value  the  franc,  announced  on  August  8, 
brought  vacationing  officials  of  the  Euro-
pean  Community  back  to  Brussels. 
The  devaluation  of  the  franc,  from  0.18 
grams of gold to 0.16  grams, resulted in the 
automatic  suspension  of  the  Community's 
agricultural unit of account pending a Coun-
cil decision on its  new value. The unit of ac-
count  is  the  common  denominator  for  all 
agricultural transactions in  the six members' 
currencies:  prices,  deficit  payments,  and 
grants  for  investments  in  farm  improve-
ments.  Meetings  of  the  European  Commu-
nities  Commission and  Council  of Ministers 
were  called  for  Monday, August  11,  to de-
cide  upon  the  new  parity.  The  Monetary 
Committee met on August 10  to prepare an 
advisory opinion. 
Unit of Account: Brief History 
The  Community's  first  financial  regulation 
defined  the  unit  of  account  at  0.88867088 
grams  of fine  gold,  which  is  the  parity of 
the  U.S.  dollar.  This  definition  was  chosen 
as a matter of convenience; since the Bretton 
Woods  Agreement of  1944  creating  the In-
ternational  Monetary  Fund,  all  currencies 
have been defined  in terms of dollar parity. 
The  unit  of  account  took  on  particular 
importance in the field  of agriculture because 
of the single price system for farm products 
of the  Six  covered  by  common market or-
ganizations.  It  is  the  only  field  in  which 
Community  action-setting  common  prices 
denominated  only  in  units  of account-has 
a  direct,  substantial,  and  immediate  impact 
on the cost of living in  the individual mem-
ber countries and on their competitive posi-
tions  with  each  other  and  with  the  rest  of 
the  world.  Special  provision  was  made  for 
the agricultural unit of account, as the Com-
mon  Market  in  agriculture  could  no longer 
have  operated  if  even  one  government 
changed the value of its currency. 
The necessary  flexibility  was  provided  by 
Council Regulation 653 /68 of May 30, 1968, 
outlining  the  conditions  for  modifying  the 
value of the agricultural unit of account: 
•  automatically,  in  the  event  the  parity of 
every  member  country's  currency  changed 
simultaneously and  in  the same direction. 
•  by decision of the Council, in  the event of 
a  non-uniform change in  the parities of the 
member countries' currencies. In that event, 
the  value  of the  unit  of  account  would  be 
suspended  from  the  time of the  official  an-
nouncement of a change in parity to the pub-
lication  of the new  value of the unit of ac-
count. 
The French Devaluation 
The French franc was devalued  12.5 per cent 
in  terms of its gold parity and 11.11  per cent 
in  terms  of  the  Community's  agricultural 
unit  of  account  and  the  U.S.  dollar.  The 
official  communique announcing the devalu-
ation,  following  a  special  session  of  the 
French Council of Ministers also stated that 
the  French  Government had  taken  steps  to 
inform the International Monetary Fund, the 
Common Market monetary  authorities,  and 
the  members of the Franc Zone  (primarily 
French  overseas  territories  and  possessions 
and  former  French  colonies  now  inde-
pendent). 
On  French television  that evening,  Presi-
dent  Georges  Pompidou  explained  that  to 
frustrate  speculation,  his  Government  had 
"observed total  secrecy  and chosen  for  [its] 
decision a period that is usually devoted only 
to vacation." He added that devaluation was 
the first, not the only, action his Government 
planned  to  take  to  restore  balance  in  the 
French economy, and that a  complete pack-
age  of  budgetary,  financial,  and  economic 
actions would be announced. 
On  the same broadcast, Finance Minister 
Valery Giscard d'Estaing explained  why the 
Government had decided to devalue by 12.5 
per cent and  not another figure.  On the for-
ward  exchange  markets,  "the  place  where 
outside of France foreigners assess the value 
of the franc, which means the risks that they 
take  to  keep  our  national  currency  for  a 
month,  there  was  an  11-12  per  cent  dis-
count  in  the  franc,  and  so  the  franc's  real 
value  had  diverged  from  its  theoretical 
value." 
The Community's Response 
By  Monday,  August  11,  all  but one of the 
14  members  of  the  Commission,  and  each 
member  country's  mm1ster  for  agriculture 
and  minister  for monetary matters,  had ar-
rived  in  Brussels  for  the  Council  meeting 
that lasted until  5 the  next morning. At the 
close  of  the  meeting,  the  Council  unani-
mously  expressed  its  desire  to  cooperate 
with the French Government's efforts to re-
store  economic  and  monetary  equilibrium 
which "could only facilitate the proper work-
ing of the Community." 
It decided  to  maintain the  common  agri-
cultural prices  and  the parity of the agricul-
tural unit of account, but to allow France to 
reduce  its  support  price  to  French farmers 
by  11.11  per  cent,  to  prevent  increases  in 
domestic consumer and  producer prices  and 
to  discourage  production  surpluses.  (How-
ever,  the  regulation  also  permitted  France 
to make a  reduction smaller than  11.11  per 
cent.  Before  the  1969170  marketing  year, 
the Council will  decide on final  adjustments 
in  French  farm  prices.  In  so  doing,  it  will 
pay special attention so  that the decision will 
not lead to a  significant increase in produc-
tion,  put  an  unnecessary  burden  on  con-
sumers, interfere with the free movement of 
goods,  or  adversely  affect  farmers  in  other 
member countries.  In  any case,  the Council 
said  that  the  final  adjustment  of  French 
prices to the common prices should be com-
pleted by the beginning of the 1971/72 mar-
keting year. 
To prevent distortions in farm trade within 
the  Community,  France must  subsidize  im-
ports  from  the  other  Community  members 
and  non-member  countries  (so  that  prices 
on imported goods can be kept to their cur-
rent level)  and pay compensatory levies  on 
its  exports  to  other  Community  members 
and non-member countries. 
Before  November 30,  1969,  the. Commis-
The  Commission's  first  meeting  this  fall,  on  September  11,  in  its  new  facilities  of  the 
recently  completed Berlaimont Center,  Brussels. sion is  to  report to the Council of Ministers 
on  the  effects  of  these  measures  and,  if 
necessary,  suggest  alternatives. 
Effects on Migrants' Social Security 
The  devaluation  also  affected  several  thou-
sand  Belgian,  Luxembourg,  German,  and 
Italian workers  who  cross  the  border  daily 
to their jobs in France, and also an unknown 
number of non-Community migrant workers. 
Not  only  do  these  workers  lose  money  in 
converting  their  salaries  into  their  national 
currencies,  but  also  the  value  of  payments 
by  the  French  social  insurance  agencies 
diminishes. 
When the European Parliament's Commit-
tee on Social Affairs and  Public Health met 
on September 11  to consider these problems, 
Commission  Vice  Pr,esident  Lionello  Levi 
Sandri  testified  before  it.  In  view  of  the 
urgency  of  these  ma.tters,  he  said,  bilateral 
contacts  had  been  started  between the  gov-
ernments  involved.  One  solution  he  men-
tioned,  for  which  there  are  precedents,  was 
the payment of an exchange bonus for salary 
transfers,  with  the  expenses  divided  by  the 
devaluing  country  and  the  employer.  For 
compensating for depreciation in social insur-
ance  payments,  he  said,  a  new  procedure 
would be necessary. 
The  Committee  thought  that  as  long  as 
the  Community  does  not  have  a  common 
monetary  policy,  it  should  make  arrange-
ments  to  compensate  for  the  repercussions 
of monetary events in the social field.  Among 
the  suggestions put forward  was  the  alloca-
tion of money to the European Social Fund 
for this purpose. These and other suggestions 
will  be debated at the European Parliament's 
next plenary  session,  in  October. 
SENEGAL'S  PEANUT  HARVEST 
More  and  more  of the  peanuts  that  Euro-
peans  nibble  at  parties  or  while  watching 
television  are  likely  to come  from  Senegal, 
the former French colony in West Africa and 
now one of the  18  African States associated 
with  the  European  Community  by  the 
Yaounde Convention. 
Peanuts  are  a  refined  form of groundnut 
which originally grew wild.  Today the culti-
vated nuts are processed into oil  or oilcake. 
It is  an undemanding plant, but the peanuts 
themselves have to be carefully tended. Over 
the  past  six  years  Senegal  has  doubled  the 
average crop yield to 1,100 lbs per acre. 
To meet  rising  world demand,  the  Euro-
pean Development Fund recently made $1.11 
million  available  to  expand  the  area  under 
0 
peanut cultivation from 6,700 acres to 24,700 
acres  by  1972.  Senegal  should  by  then  be 
able  to  sell  1i,400  metric  tons  a  year  to 
Europe and America. 
Three Weedings Double Harvest 
To get a good crop the seeds  must be sown 
towards the end of June, at the peak of the 
rainy season. In this way there is still enough 
moisture in  the ground  at harvest time  110 
days  later. If the  soil  is  too  dry,  the stems 
break. In the past, too many farmers ignored 
the  deadline.  Now,  instructional  films  teach 
Senegal's  farmers  that  nature  demands 
punctuality and explain to them the need for 
greater seed density and the use of fertilizers. 
On average, fields used to be hoed only once; 
films  demonstrate how weeding  can increase 
the  harv~st 
0 and  therefore  farmers'  earning 
capacity.  The farmer  who  hoes  three  times 
can double his profits. 
Inquiries  by  the  European  Development 
Fund  show  that  the  Senegalese  authorities 
are backing up the Community's supplies of 
artificial  fertilizers,  pesticides,  and  agri-
cultural equipment with practical instruction, 
audiovisual  teaching,  and  evaluation  of the 
results. Senegal itself is paying for part of the 
project  to  extend  its  peanut  acreage.  The 
Dakar government has  undertaken to assign 
a trained Senegalese  assistant to each  Euro-
pean  adviser  within  the  next  four  years. 
After  1972  the  local  experts  will  take  over 
from the Europeans. 
If the  instructions  are properly observed, 
the  1972  harvest  from  the  24,700  acres 
should yield about $2  million more than the 
cost of the entire project over four  years. 
EIB  1968 LOANS  SET  RECORD 
The  European  Investment  Bank  last  year 
made loans  of $289  million,  a  record  high 
since  its  establishment  in  1958.  It  raised 
$212.5  million-also a record-On the inter-
national  capital  market  to  finance  its  oper-
ations  for  economic  development  in  the 
Community and associated states. 
During 1968 the Bank agreed to make 39 
loans of a total value of $250.7 million for 
projects  in  the  Six  and  associated  African 
states, seven loans totaling $27 million under 
its special section for projects in Turkey, and 
five  loans totaling $11.2 million, financed by 
the  European  Development  Fund,  for  de-
velopment  projects  in  the  associated  states 
and  overseas  territories.  The  Bank  loaned 
$232.8  million  in  1967  and  an  average  of 
about $130 million a year in 1964-66. 
By  the  end  of  last  year,  the  Bank  had 
made a total of 237 loans with a total value 
of  $1.26  billion.  The  overall  value  of  the 
projects  aided  by  the  Bank's  operations  is 
much greater, for these loans normally pro-
vide  only  a  minor  part of the  total  capital 
investment. 
Development of Southern Italy 
As .in previous years, the Bank in 1968 gave 
priority to development in Southern Italy (25 
loans totaling $122.5 million-almost 50 per 
cent  of ordinary  loans  in  1968).  Italy  has 
received two thirds of the loans made to date 
for  projects  inside  the  Community-$646.2 
million  out of $987.5  million-but the pro-
portion  of  total  capital  going  to  Italy  is 
gradually  declining  as  the value of projects 
aided  in  Turkey  and  Africa  rises.  Projects 
aided  with  EIB  loans  in  1968  included  two 
stretches  of  turnpike  (in  Sicily  and  across 
the Appenines), an  aqueduct in Apulia, and 
improved  telephone  communications  in  the 
South. 
France,  in  1968  as  in  earlier  years,  re-
ceived  substantial  loans  from  the  EIB.  Last 
year's  $49.6  million  raised  the French total 
to  $187  million  during the Bank's ten years 
of operation. Turnpike projects,  one in Bel-
gium  and  the other in  Germany,  also  bene-
fited  from  1968  EIB  loans. 
The  EIB's  ordinary  operations  in  Africa, 
$24.3  million  in  1968,  included  loans  for 
food-processing  facilities in the Ivory Coast, 
industrial  projects  and  roads in  Gabon,  and 
copper-ore mining in Mauritania. 
Breaking  down  the  1968  loans  by  eco-
nomic  sector  shows  that  there  was  particu-
lar  stress  on  transport  facilities  ( $110 
million, or 38  per cent of total loans). This 
included  $52  million for four road projects. 
In  second  place  came  industry,  particularly 
mining,  with  a  total of $84  million. 
Borrowing: Half in German Marks 
More  than  half  the  Em's  1968  borrowings 
($137.5  million)  were  raise9i  in  German 
marks, contributing to  the ou(ftow of capital 
from  Germany.  Funds  were  also  raised  on 
the Italian ($24  million), Belgian  ($45 mil-
lion), Dutch ($11  million), and international 
European ($25 million) capital markets. The 
terms  of  these  loans  ranged  from  six  to 
twenty years, with annual interest rates from 
6.25 to 6.75 per cent. 
"A  GOOD  GERMAN  IS  A 
EUROPEAN" 
"A  good  German  cannot  be  a  nationalist. 
Today a  German with a national conscious-
ness  can  only  be  a  European,"  President 
Gustav  Heinemann  said  on  the  25th  anni-
versary  of the attempt on Hitler's life,  July 
20,  1944. 
Speaking  at  Plotzensee,  the  place  where 
many of the conspirators were executed, the 
President  warned  of the  dangers  of a  new 
nationalist movement. 
President Heinemann warned that nation-
alism had caused nothing but harm, both for 
the  Germans  and  the  rest  of  Europe.  This 
calamity  must  not  be  allowed  to  happen 
again.  The President  said  that people  must 
guard against any rebirth of nationalism.  17 18 
FIRST  PROPOSAL  ON 
COMMON  TRADE  POLICY 
WITH  E.  EUROPE 
The European Communities Commission in 
July  presented  to  the  Council  of  Ministers 
its  first  proposal  on  a  common  policy  for 
trade  with  East European countries.  It lists 
goods  imported  from  East  Europe  that 
would be freed from  all  quantitative restric-
tions. 
For  Poland  and  Czechoslovakia  (both 
members  of  the  General  Agreement  on 
Tariffs  and  Trade)  the  list  includes  about 
100 industrial and agricultural products. For 
the  other  state-trading  countries-Bulgaria, 
Hungary,  Rumania, and the Soviet Union-
the  liberalization  list  is  virtually  limited  to 
agricultural produce. 
The  Council  adopted  in  December  1968 
three outline regulations on a common trad-
ing  policy  with  free  market  countries  and 
agreed  to  enact a  uniform policy for  Com-
munist nations before the  end of the transi-
tion period, January I, 1970. 
DOCUMENTATION  CENTERS 
The  European  Community  has  designated 
more  than  a  hundred  official  depositories 
and  documentation  centers  throughout  the 
world for the convenience of professors, stu-
dents,  and  businessmen  who  must  consult 
Community documents but who are far from 
a  Community  Information  Service  office. 
There are 23  depositories and documentation 
centers  in  North  America.  They  are  listed 
below by country, state or province, and city. 
United States 
CALIFORNIA:  University of California, Berke-
ley;  University  of  California,  Los  Angeles; 
Stanford University, Stanford. 
COLORADO:  University of Colorado, Boulder. 
CONNECTICUT:  Yale University, New Haven. 
DISTRICT  OF  COLUMBIA:  Library of Congress. 
ILLINOIS:  Library of International Relations, 
Chicago;  University  of  Chicago  Library, 
Chicago; University of Illinois Law Building, 
Champaign. 
INDIANA:  Indiana University Library, Bloom-
ington;  University  of  Notre  Dame,  Notre 
Dame. 
MASSACHUSETTS:  Harvard  Law  School  Li-
brary, Cambridge. 
MICHIGAN:  University of Michigan, Ann Ar-
bor; Michigan State University, East Lansing. 
MINNESOTA:  University  of  Minnesota,  Min-
neapolis. 
MISSOURI:  Washington University, St.  Louis. 
NEW  YORK:  Council  on  Foreign  Relations, 
New York; New York Public Library,  New 
York;  New  York  University  Law  Library, 
New  York;  State  University  of  New  York, 
Buffalo. 
NORTH  CAROLINA:  Duke  University  Library, 
Durham. 
NEW JERSEY:  Princeton University, Princeton. 
PENNSYLVANIA:  University  of  Pennsylvania, 
Philadelphia;  Pennsylvania State University, 
University Park. 
TEXAS:  University of Texas, Austin. 
VIRGINIA:  University of Virginia, Charlottes-
ville. 
WASHINGTON:  University  of  Washington, 
Seattle. 
WISCONSIN:  University  of  Wisconsin,  Mad-
ison. 
Canada 
ONTARIO:  Carlton University School of Inter-
national Affairs,  Ottawa; Queen's University, 
Kingston. 
QUEBEC:  McGill University, Montreal. 
Mexico 
NUEVO  LEON:  Universidad  de  Nuevo  Leon, 
Monterrey. 
TEACHING  AND 
RESEARCH  AIDS 
In  addition  to  its  specialized  research  and 
documentation service, the Information Serv-
ice  of the  European Communities  can pro-
vide professors and teachers with visual aids, 
(films and exhibits) and basic, general publi-
cations.  Except where otherwise noted, they 
can be ordered from the European Commu-
nities  Information  Service,  808  Farragut 
Building, Washington, D. C.  20006. 
Publications 
EUROPEAN  STUDIES,  TEACHER'S  SERIES  I.  Euro-
pean Communities Information Service, Lon-
don, 1968, free. 
Prepared  especially  for  use  in  secondary 
schools, this "teachers' kit" contains separate 
papers  on the  historical  background  of the 
Community,  the  Community's  population, 
institutions,  and  trade.  It  also  contains  a 
selected reading list. 
THE  FACTS.  European Community  Informa-
tion Service,  Brussels,  1967,  32  pages,  free. 
A  general  brochure  about  the  European 
Community,  reviewing  the  development  of 
the  Community  in  the  first  decade  of  its 
existence. 
Q &  A ON  THE  EEC:  SOME  OF  THE  QUESTIONS 
ASKED  ABOUT  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY 
AND  SOME  OF  THE  RELEVANT  FACTS,  Euro-
pean Community Information Service,  Lon-
don, 8 pages, free. 
QUESTIONS  AND  ANSWERS:  THE  EUROPEAN 
COMMON  MARKET,  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMU-
NITIES,  Manhattan  Publishing  Company, 
New York, 1968, 79 pages, free. 
This booklet contains a 55-page section of 
questions  and  answers  with  a  table  of con-
tents. A second section contains a factual ac-
count of the Community's achievements. In-
cludes  a  bibliography  and list of additional 
sources of information. 
THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY  IN  MAPS,  Euro-
pean  Community  Information  Service, 
Brussels/Luxembourg,  1967,  8.5  inches x 11 
inches,  color, free. 
Contains  twelve  maps:  administrative  re-
gions  and  units;  population  density;  agri-
cultural  land  utilization  and  main  crops; 
livestock farming and fishing; energy; nuclear 
industry; iron, steel and selected branches of 
engineering;  major  industrial  regions  and 
distribution of manpower by activities;  rail-
roads  and  navigation;  roads  and  civil  avia-
tion;  external trade; and associated overseas 
states and territories. 
Films 
These  films  may  be  borrowed  from  the 
European  Community  Information  Service, 
Washington,  free of charge: 
ATOMS  FOR  PEACE.  R.  Paul-Dagan, producer. 
Color, 16 mm, 15  minutes,  1967. 
Describes  the  work  being  done  at  the 
Community's research center in Ispra, Italy, 
to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. 
A DOOR  oPENS.  Michel Alexandre,  producer. 
Color, 16 mm, 40 minutes, 1967. 
This  film  describes  the  Community's  ef-
forts to help governments and private indus-
try to retrain workers and bring new life to 
depressed mining areas. 
EUROPE  WITHOUT  FRONTIERS.  Monitor Films, 
producer. Black and white,  16 mm, 37  min-
utes, 1961. 
The film  shows what the Six had done for 
European  unity  up  to  1961.  It shows  how 
the  European  Economic  Community,  Coal 
and  Steel  Community,  and  Euratom  work, 
and  highlights  some of their  achievements: 
increased  output  and  modernization  in  the 
coal and steel industries, creation of a com-
mon agricultural policy, facilities for the free 
movement of workers,  and  the program for 
peaceful use of the atom. A free copy of this 
film  available  to  the  first  twenty  organiza-
tions requesting it. 
EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY.  Sean Graham, direc-
tor.  R.  H.  Riley,  producer.  Color,  16  mm, 
19 minutes, 1965. 
Europe cannot remain  divided  in  today's 
world  of  giants.  The  film  shows  what  the 
Six  have  already  done  for  European  unity 
and  explains  how  the  European  Economic 
Community,  Coal  and  Steel  Community, 
and  Atomic  Energy  Community  work. 
This film can be purchased or rented from 
McGraw Hill:  1211  Polk Street, San Fran-
cisco,  California  94109,  828  Custer  Street, Evanston,  IJlinois  60602,  or  330  W.  42nd 
Street, New York, N.Y.  10036. 
EUROPA. Ted Lowry, director. Pelican Films, 
producer.  Color,  16  mm  and  35  mm,  13 
minutes, 1963. 
A  cartoon  dialogue  between  Zeus  and 
Europa explains the lessons  of the past and 
views  the  future  with  hope.  The  six  Euro-
pean Community members have pooled their 
economic  destinies,  wanting  to  become  a 
healthy, strong family. 
All of these films  are in English. Language 
teachers may request information on films in 
the  Community's  four  official  languages 
(French,  German,  Dutch  and  Italian)  for 
showing  to their  advanced  classes. 
RECENT  BOOKS  ON COMMUNITY TOPICS 
Decisions  for  Europe:  The  Necessity  of 
Britain's Engagement.  By  J.  L. Zaring.  The 
Johns  Hopkins  Press,  Baltimore,  1969,  221 
pages with Index. 
An examination of the issues of power poli-
tics in Western Europe in the late 1960's and 
the European Community's role in them. 
The author gives  a  concise history  of the 
Community  and  briefly  explains  how  its 
institutions  work.  So  far,  the  author  states, 
the  Community,  operating  primarily  in the 
economic  arena,  has  created  a  vacuum 
"which  is  both  the  imperative  and  the  in-
centive  to  further  economic  and  political 
integration." If the Community does not ad-
vance into political unity, it risks losing gains 
it has made on the economic level. The proc-
ess  of political  integration  can resume  only 
after a change in the balance of power with-
in  the  Community,  by  its  enlargement-to 
include Britain. 
Africa and the Common Market. By P. N.C. 
Okigbo.  Longmans,  Green  and  Co.,  Ltd., 
London,  1967,  183  pages  with Index. 
An  examination  of  Africa's  relations  with 
the European Community and the possibili-
ties for an African Common Market. 
This  book  grew  out of the  author's  mis-
sion in  1963,  at the request of the Nigerian 
Government, to explore  the possibilities  for 
closer  relations with the Community. In ad-
dition  to  two  chapters  devoted  entirely  to 
the  association  between  Nigeria  and  the 
Community,  the  book  contains  chapters  on 
the  Community's  other  association  agree-
ments.  Special  attention  is  given  to  the  de-
cisions  that  English-speaking  African mem-
bers  of  the  British  Commonwealth  must 
make  in  choosing  association  with  the 
Community. 
The  Second  Try:  Labour  and  the  EEC. 
Edited  by  Uwe  Kitzinger.  Pergamon  Press, 
London,  New  York,  1968,  353  pages  with 
Statistical  Tables,  Bibliography,  Suggested 
Exercises, and Index. 
A collection of documents, speeches, articles, 
and cartoons on British application for mem-
bership  in  the  European  Community,  with 
introduction by  Mr.  Kitzinger. 
The book  covers  the  reactions to the  ap-
plication-in Britain, on the Continent, and 
in  the United States-as well as the views of 
the European Communities Commission and 
French President Charles de Gaulle. 
Tariff·Making and Trade Policy in the U.S. 
and  Canada.  By  Kenneth  C.  Mackenzie. 
Frederick A.  Praeger, New York,  1968.  294 
pages. 
This  Praeger  Special  Study  focuses  on  the 
tariff-making  process  in  Canada  and  the 
United States and the influence that particu-
lar constitutional and legislative frameworks 
have on each country's tariff structure. "Each 
country  stamps  its  tariff  laws  with  certain 
characteristic  features  designed  to  reinforce 
the  centers of effective power." The authors 
find  that delegating legislation in  the United 
States tends  to  be detailed  because of Con-
gressional  efforts  to  control  Presidential 
authority.  The  book  also  discusses  the  ad-
ministrative  structure  used  to  prepare  for 
international  tariff  bargaining  and  devices 
such  as  the  "escape  clause"  developed  in 
conjunction with the  1962  Trade Expansion 
Act. Included is  a study of Section 22 of the 
Agricultural  Adjustment  Act,  under  which 
certain agricultural imports are restricted. 
Economic  Cooperation  in  Latin  America, 
Africa,  and  Asia:  A  Handbook  of  Docu-
ments.  Edited  by  Miguel  S.  Wionczek.  The 
M.I.T.  Press,  Massachusetts  Institute  of 
Technology,  Cambridge,  Massachusetts, 
1969,  556 pages with  Appendix and  Index. 
Annotated  documents  related  to  economic 
integration  in  the southern hemisphere with 
an  introduction explaining the current status 
and  prospects  for  economic  integration  in 
the developing countries. 
The author has collected these documents 
to  provide  a  guide  for  students  and  policy 
makers in  the  economically advanced  coun-
tries and "to offer some help to those experts 
and policy makers in  Latin America, Africa, 
and  Asia  who  consider  regional  economic 
integration  a  potentially  important  weapon 
in  the  search  for  accelerated  development 
and industrialization." 
Food,  Farming,  and  the  Common  Market. 
By  Michael Butterwick and Edmund Neville 
Rolfe.  Oxford  University,  London,  New 
York, Toronto, 1968. 259 pages. 
A study of the food and agricultural policies 
of  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  European 
Economic  Community  and  the  resultant 
problems  Britain  faces  in  negotiating  entry 
into the Common Market. 
The authors,  both agricultural economists 
at  Oxford,  describe  and  compare  develop-
ments in  Britain since the Second World War 
with  agricultural  trends  since  1958  in  each 
country in the Community. Trading patterns 
are discussed, as  well  as  consumption trends, 
farming costs,  support systems,  and  market-
ing  methods.  Finally,  the book explores the 
likely  effects  on  the  United  Kingdom  of 
joining  with  the  Community  in  a  common 
agricultural  policy  and  reviews  Britain's 
1961-63  negotiations  to  determine  what  is 
negotiable in any future talks on British entry. 
Ten Years of E.E.C.: Lessons and Prospects 
for Industry.  Report on  a  two-day  Confer-
ence November 6-7,  1968. Federal Trust for 
Education  and  Research,  London,  1968.  42 
pages. 
A collection of papers delivered at a Federal 
Trust  conference  and  a  summary  of  the 
proceedings. 
The pamphlet includes speeches by Georg 
Kahn-Ackerman, S.P.D. member of the Ger-
man Bundestag, on "Germany and European 
Unity"; Etienne  Hirsch, former president of 
Euratom,  on  "The  Common  Market-The 
First Decade and After"; and J. R. Schaetzel, 
U.S.  Ambassador  to  the  European  Co,m-
munities,  on  the  "E.E.C.  and  the  Uniied 
States."  Other speakers  covered the  relation 
between  individual  countries'  industry  or 
economy  and  the  Common  Market. 
An  Economic  Geography  of  the  Common 
Market.  By  Geoffrey  Parker.  Frederick  A. 
Praeger, New York,  1969.  178 pages. 
Third  in  a  series of Praegar Monographs in 
geography. 
This  book  is  an  appraisal,  from  a  geo-
graphical  viewpoint,  of  the  significance  of 
the economic union of the Six as  well as  the 
nature of Britain's relationship with the coun-
tries  of  the  Common  Market.  The  author 
tries  to  present  "a  picture  of  economic 
activity in the Common Market as  a whole" 
and  to study the effects  of the organization 
"on  the  landscape,  the  economic  develop-
ment,  and  the  political  allegiances  of  the 
European mainland." 
Agriculture and International Trade.  Edited 
by R.  Charles Brooks. Proceedings of a two-
day  conference  by  the  Agricultural  Policy 
Institute, North Carolina State University, Ra-
leigh, North Carolina, March 1969. 180pages. 
This  conference  was  held  to  examine  the  19 changes occuring in world affairs, the signifi-
cance of international trade  to farmers  and 
farm  related  businesses,  and  the  effects  of 
recent  trade  negotiation  on  southern  agri. 
culture. 
U.S.  trade  policies  and  balance-of-pay-
ments problems, new international monetary 
developments,  changing  trade  patterns  and 
agreements,  and  recent  U.S.  efforts  to  ex-
pand world trade were topics stressed in the 
papers and discussion.  Also considered were 
barriers  to  trade  expansion,  including  trade 
bloc policies and their impediments to trade. 
The conference pointed out that the growth 
of trade bloc  countries  with  common trade 
policies  affecting  agriculture  is  having  an 
increasing  impact  on  the  ability  of  U.S. 
agriculture  to  compete  in  world  markets. 
Nordic Studies in International Politics, Vol. 
IV,  No.  1,  1969,  Cooperation  and  Conflict. 
Edited by Klaus Tornudd, Universitetsforla-
get, Boston and Oslo, 72 pages. 
This  issue,  devoted  to  Scandinavian  and 
Western  European  economic  integration, 
contains  articles  on "Sweden  and  the Euro-
pean  Economic Community" by Mats Berg-
quist,  "Denmark and  European Integration" 
by  Peter  Hanseo,  "Norway  and  Western 
Europe  Economic  Integration"  by  Kaare 
Sandegren, and "Finland and Economic Inte-
gration in Europe" by Klaus Tornudd. 
PUBLICATIONS AVAILABLE 
LE POUVOIR FISCAL DANS  LES  ETATS  MEMBRES 
DE  LA  COMMUNAUTE. Serie Concurrence No. 
8,  Commission  of the  European  Communi-
ties,  Brussels,  1969, 75  pages ................ $2.00 
A  study of each  member state of the Com-
munity outlining where the power to tax lies 
in  that state.  Legislative  and  administrative 
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CENTRAL  BUREAU  FOR  NUCLEAR  MEASURE-
MENTS:  EURATOM. European Community In-
formation  Service,  Brussels,  1968,  12  pages 
..................................................................  free 
Describes  the  main  equipment  and  current 
programs of the bureau. 
NOMENCLATURE  UNIFORME  DES  MARCHAN-
DISES  POUR LES  STATISTIQUES  DE  TRANSPORT: 
NST  1968.  Statistical  Office  of the European 
Communities, Luxembourg,  1969, 479  pages 
································································  $1.00 
Nomenclature  for  transport  of merchandise 
statistics. Publishes concordances of the NST 
with  the  NIMEXE  (harmonized  nomencla-
ture  for  foreign  trade  statistics),  CST (tariff 
and statistical  classification  for  international 
trade),  and  NDB  (Brussels  tariff  nomen-
clature).  Detailed  alphabetical  list  of prod-
ucts included. 
Available  with  alphabetical  list  in  French. 
German,  Italian  and  Dutch  texts  can  be 
specially ordered. 
IRON  AND  STEEL:  1968  YEARBOOK.  Statistical 
Office  of  the  European  Communities,  Lux-
embourg,  1969  (French/German/Dutch/ 
Italian text), 404 pages .......................... $2.50 
Part  /-Production,  employment,  deliveries 
and orders,  trade,  and supply  and consump-
tion  of raw  materials  in  the  iron  and  steel 
industries.  Also  includes  information  on 
scrap  and  manganese.  Part  li-Special his-
torical  section  with  data  on  production,  in-
vestments,  consumption,  prices  and  trade 
with some tables beginning in 1860 but most 
from 1925 
STATISTIQUES  SOCIALES:  1968  ANNUAIRE.  Sta-
tistical Office of the European Communities, 
Luxembourg,  1968  (French/German  text), 
361  pages ................................................ $2.50 
The  only  issue  in  the  social  statistics  series 
published  in  1968.  Contains  data  through 
-=~  Return  Reque•led 
1967  on  population,  employment,  salaries, 
standard of living, education, social accounts 
of  each  member  state,  socal  security,  and 
occupational accidents. 
INVESTMENTS  IN  THE  COMMUNITY  COALMIN-
ING  AND  IRON  AND  STEEL  INDUSTRIES.  Com-
mission  of  the  European  Communities, 
Brussels, July 1969, 94 pages ................  $4.00 
Investment data as of January  I, 1969. 
LA  PRODUCTIVITE DU  CAPITAL DE 21  BRANCHES 
INDUSTRIELLES  DANS  LA  REPUBLIQUE  FED-
ERALE  D'ALLEMAGNE  DE  1950  A  1975.  Serie 
Economie et Finances No. 6,  Commission of 
the  European  Communities,  Brussels,  1968. 
133  pages ................................................ $5.00 
A  study by Rolf Krengel of the productivity 
of capital in 21  German industries from 1950 
through  1964. Projections of investment and 
employment  for  1970  and  1975  are  also 
given.  Also available in  German. 
ENERGY  STATISTICS  YEARBOOK:  1968-1967. 
Statistical Office of the European Communi-
ties,  Luxembourg,  1969, 348 pages ...... $2.50 
Part  1-The energy  situation  during  1967. 
Part  ll-Principal  energy  indicators  and 
overall energy  balance sheets.  Part Ill-Sta-
tistics by sources of energy. (Includes data on 
coal,  patent  fuel,  coke,  lignite,  browncoal 
briquettes,  gas,  petroleum,  and  electrical 
energy.) Seven  maps on the energy situation 
are also attached. 
NATIONAL  ACCOUNTS  &  BALANCES  OF  PAY-
MENTS:  1958-1967.  Statistical  Office  of the 
European Communities, Luxembourg,  1969, 
286  pages  ................................................ $2.00 
Part  /-National  Accounts,  supplies  recent 
data from the national accounts of the Com-
munity countries and  certain  aggregates  for 
the  United  Kingdom,  United  States,  and 
Japan.  Part ll-Balance of Payments, of the 
Community  and  the  member  states  with 
major geographical zones  . 
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